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I.

Introduction

Linda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton Christian Schools
(hereinafter DCS), in Dayton, Ohio. In January, 1979, she casually
informed the principal that she was pregnant. As a result of Hoskinson's announcement, the principal promptly advised her that
her teaching contract would not be renewed for the following year.
As a Christian mother, the principal said, her place was at home
with her preschool-aged children and she would be a poor Christian example at the school if she continued to teach.1
Following this conversation, Hoskinson attempted to discuss
her contract with the school board. When this proved unsuccessful, she consulted her attorney, who sent a letter to the school
threatening legal action based on the school's alleged sexual discrimination against Hoskinson. As a result of that letter, Hoskinson was immediately terminated. 2 The school considered her
consultation with an attorney a violation of its concept of "the Biblical Chain of Command" 3 and therefore a violation of her contract
* John P. Boyle received his M.A. from St. John's University and will receive
his J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law School in 1987.
1. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 106
S. Ct. 2718 (1986), 802 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1986) (no opinion issued on remand). The
letter from principal James Rakestraw specifically stated:
My concern . . . was ...

that as you will be a new parent (June) your

teaching next year would be in contrast to the School's philosophy. As
a school, we see the importance of the mother in the home during the
early years of child growth. This is a factor we consider as we interview prospective teachers. If there are pre-school age children in the
home we recommend the mother stay there and do not accept her
application.
766 F.2d at 934 n.2.
2. Id. at 934.
3. The school argued that this "Biblical Chain of Command" concept was embodied in paragraph 13 of Hoskinson's contract which stated: "The teacher agrees to
follow the Biblical pattern of Matthew 18:15-17 and Galations [sic] 6:1 and always
give a good report. All differences are to be resolved by utilizing Biblical principles-always representing a united front." Id. at 934 n.3.
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warranting termination.4
Hoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter Commission) alleging sex discrimination.
When the Commission began discovery, the school and other plaintiffs joined in the suit 5 brought a complaint challenging the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate its hiring practices. 6 The
plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment arguing that the application of the Ohio Civil Rights Act against the school was unconstitutional, violating its first, ninth, and fourteenth amendment
rights. 7 The school also sought injunctive relief to enjoin the Commission from interfering with the school's free exercise of its religious beliefs.8
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio, Western Division, upheld the Ohio Civil Rights Commission's jurisdiction over the school concerning Hoskinson's termination. 9 DCS appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. The circuit court reversed the district court, holding
that the Commission's jurisdiction over the school was an impermissible entanglement by the state in the religious affairs of the
school.10 The Commission then appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court, where it was dismissed on abstention grounds and
left for the Ohio state courts to adjudicate."
The Dayton ChristianSchools decision presents troubling issues which this article will address. One such issue is how much
4. The minutes of the board meeting terminating Hoskinson stated: "The
Board... has concluded that there is a serious philosophical difference between the
Hoskinsons and Dayton Christian Schools. This has been evidenced by violation of
paragraph 13, contained in the contract between Linda Hoskinson and Dayton
Christian School dated April 17." Id. at 934 n.3.
5. The other plaintiffs joined in the suit were Patterson Park Church, Christian Tabernacle, DCS Superintendant Claude Schindler, parents Stephen and
Camillia House, and DCS teacher Paul Pyle. Id. at 935.
6. The plaintiffs brought their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commission, five commissioners, the Ohio Attorney General, Commission directors, and
two assistant state attorney generals. Id.
7. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the enforcement of the state civil
rights act violated their free exercise rights, and that the attempts by the Commission to exercise jurisdiction violated the establishment clause. Id.
8. The district court granted a temporary restraining order pending trial on
the merits. In their complaint, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining the Commission from interfering with the school. Id.
9. 578 F. Supp. at 1041.
10. 766 F.2d at 956, 961. As the Supreme Court discussed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), one of the tests for whether the state has violated
the establishment clause is whether a statute fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion.
11. 106 S. Ct. 2718, 2722-24 (1986). For a discussion of the abstention doctrine,
see i7fra notes 190-194 and accompanying text.
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deference should courts give to discriminatory religious beliefs?
Additionally, are the religious beliefs used by certain religious
groups to protect employment discrimination merely practices that
circumvent public policy and perpetuate a stereotypical denegration of women in society? And finally, what opportunities do discriminating religious employers have to declare a practice to be a
religious belief deserving constitutional protection?
Using the Dayton Christian Schools decision as a backdrop,
this article will explore these issues. First, this article compares
and contrasts the various circuit and district court cases involving
gender discrimination disputes with religious organizations. Second, the article explores the courts' rationale used in the Dayton
Christian Schools decisions in light of these earlier cases. Third,
relying on the ideology of the Christian Fundamentalist Right 12 as
a contemporary example of the development of unequal gender
roles within religious belief structures, this article examines public
policy concerns presented by the Dayton ChristianSchools line of
cases and similar court decisions.
Specifically, the public policy concerns addressed by this article concern the dangers to society in general and to women in particular if, because of fear of government entanglement in religious
matters under the first amendment, courts automatically defer to
religious groups or organizations like DCS. Without minimally
testing the legitimacy of the claim of a "belief" upon which a discriminatory practice is based, courts risk giving a free hand to religious groups to carry on discrimination against women--a group
often not regarded by some religious groups as equal with men. 13
From a policy standpoint, it is one thing for gender-selective belief
practices to be carried on within the privacy of the home or within
the ecclesiastical ranks of the church.14 A completely different is12. In its teacher's manual, the school asserted that it saw itself as an extension
of the local evangelical fundamentalist church's Christian education program. 766
F.2d at 1010.
For the purposes of discussion, this article will examine the constitutional
questions raised by Dayton ChristianSchools in light of the contemporary Chris-

tian fundamentalist movement. Generally, Christian fundamentalism is a church
movement marked by the following characteristics: 1) a strong emphasis and belief
that the Bible is the literal and inerrant word of God; 2) a hostility to modem theology and particularly to modern critical study of the Bible; 3) a conviction that
those who do not adhere to their religious viewpoint are not truly Christian. See,
e.g., James Barr, Fundamentalism (1978) (a recent critical work on fundamentalism). For an overview of the Christian Right in the United States today, see Jerry
Falwell's Crusade: FundamentalistLegions Seek to Remake Church and Society,
Time, Sept. 2, 1985, at 48.
13. See John L. Kater, Christians on the Right: The Moral Majority in Perspective 83 (1982); Gabriel Fackre, The Religious Right and Christian Faith 37 (1982).
14. The right of churches to discriminate by sex as to who may be ordained is
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sue exists where those practices are applied in the work place
where, by law, a female employee has a right to even-handed employment treatment.
II.

Employment Gender Discrimination by Religious Groups:
Development of Case Law

The case law that has developed concerning first amendment
religion issues has encompassed several different areas of concern.
Courts have addressed such key issues as prayer in schools,15 government assistance to sectarian schools, 16 exemptions from taxation,1 7 and the free exercise of religion in public places.18 This
section examines the development of first amendment case law
pertaining to employment practices and the accompanying discrimination practiced by certain religious organizations.
A.

FederalStatutory Background

Employment discrimination is prohibited for both public and
private employers under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 19
An exemption, however, is available to religious employers under
section 2000e-1 of the Act. It provides that the Act "shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying
on by such corporation, association, educational institution or society of its activities." 20 This exemption allowing religious groups to
discriminate between employees has been interpreted by the
courts to mean that a religious employer may deliberately select
employees of a particular denomination or religious persuasion in
hiring. 2 ' The courts have held, however, that religious organizations cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin. 22 In other words, a religious employer may
beyond the scope of judicial review under the "Minister Exception." See infra

notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
17. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

18. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-1 (1976).
21. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th
Cir. 1982).
22. See Bruce Bagni, Discriminationin the Name of the Lord: A CriticalEvalu-

ation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,79 Colum. L. Rev. 1514, 1534
(1979).
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permissibly require that an employee belong to a particular religion, but it cannot discriminate based on race, sex, or national origin, nor may it use its faith requirement as a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. 23 As a result, a religious employer may require its
employees to belong to a particular faith, but it then may not discriminate based on an employee's race, sex, or national origin,
24
since title VII does not protect this additional discrimination.
B.

DiscriminationBased on Religious Affiliation

An example of permissible religious discrimination occurred
in Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor.25 The plaintiff alleged
that he was not given adequate employment consideration by the
Christian Science Monitor because he was not a Christian Scientist.26 The court examined at length the exemption granted religious organizations under title VII,27 and it found the Christian
Science Monitor to be "a religious activity of a religious organization."28 Therefore, the court held that it was "permissible for the
Monitor to apply a test of religious affiliation to candidates for employment."29 In a similar case, Larsen v. Kirkham,30 a woman's
employment contract at a Mormon school was not renewed because she did not meet the standards of participation in the Mor23. Id. See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); see infra note 46
and accompanying text.
24. See generally Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Provi-

sions of § 702 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-1) Exempting Activities of Religious Organizationsfrom Operation of Title VII Equal Employment
Opportunity Provisions, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 874 (1984).
25. 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983).
26. Id. at 975-76. When he inquired about applying, Feldstein was informed
that he stood little chance of being employed since he was not a Christian Scientist.
The employment application contained several questions relating to the applicant's

religious practices and affiliation. It closed with the statement: "The First Church
of Christ, Scientist, may by law apply the test of religious qualifications to its em-

ployment policies. Those who meet this requirement and are otherwise qualified
will be hired, promoted and transferred without regard to their race, national origin, sex, color or age." Id. at 976.
27. The exemption had been modified in 1972. Prior to that time, the exemption applied only to "religious activities" of religious organizations.

However, in

1972, the word "religious" was deleted from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. The court found
this change in the language to present a potential question of whether the amended
statute was constitutional. Id.
28. 555 F. Supp. at 978. The judge here noted that if he had found otherwise, he
may have been forced to consider the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 in
light of the establishment clause.
29. Id. at 978. As a result, the court found the ChristianScience Monitor innocent of unlawful employment practices.
30. 499 F. Supp. 960 (D. Utah 1980). The plaintiff alleged she was discriminated
against on the basis of sex and religion.
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mon church. The District Court in Utah held against the teacher
on the ground that the school could legitimately set religious participation standards.31
In Amos v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus 0hrist of Latter-Day Saints,32 persons were fired from their
jobs with church-operated corporations because they "were unable
or refused to satisfy the Mormon Church worthiness requirements
for a temple recommend." 33 The plaintiffs sued under a variety of
legal theories, including illegal religious discrimination by the defendants. 34 On defendant's motion for dismissal or summary judgment, the district court found it was undisputed that the plaintiffs
were fired for failure to meet the church's religious qualifications.
It therefore considered whether such discriminatory practices
were permissible.35 The court examined the nature of the jobs and
their relationship with the church's hierarchy, religious rituals,
and tenets to determine whether the jobs involved substantial religious activity.3 6 Here the jobs provided by one employer, a churchaffiliated gymnasium, did not involve a religious activity.3 7 More
discovery was necessary concerning another employer-a manufacturer and distributor of temple clothing-to determine whether
38
substantial religious activity was involved.
In Amos, the court conducted a very detailed analysis of the
legislative history of title VII to determine whether the religion
exemption of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 applied to secular, non-religious
jobs.3 9 It concluded that the application of title VII to "religious
organizations engaging in religious discrimination in secular, nonreligious activity" does not involve excessive entanglement, 40 nor
31. The court noted that "neither the equal protection clause nor the establishment clause checks the power of the legislature to permit a religious school, be it
Mormon, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Protestant or otherwise, the freedom to consider
religious practice and belief when hiring its teachers." Id. at 967.
32. 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 618 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Utah 1985).
33. 594 F. Supp. at 796.
34. Together with common law causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants discriminated against them on religious grounds as applied to non-religious jobs by violating section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(2)(a), and Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (Supp. 1983). 594 F. Supp. at 797.
35. 594 F. Supp. at 797.
36. Id. at 798-804.
37. Id. at 802. After analyzing its administrative structure, the court found that
nothing in the running or purpose of the recreation center (known as the Deseret
Gynmnasium) indicated that it was intended "to spread or teach the religious beliefs and doctrine and practices of sacred ritual of the Mormon Church or that it
was intended to be an integral part of church administration." Id. at 800.
38. Id. at 802-04.
39. Id. at 803-14.
40. Id. at 817.
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does it impinge on free exercise rights. 4 1 The court found that the
religious discrimination exemption in title VII as applied to secular, non-religious activities of a religious organization would "ad42
vance religion in violation of the establishment clause."
Consequently, the court sought to maintain a very limited level of
permissible discrimination based on religious affiliation. The case
was unique because of the court's examination of the nature of the
church's questioned activity to determine whether it was religious
activity or not. In a sense, the court applied title VII in its pre1972 amendment version, where only "religious" activities of a reli43
gious employer were excluded from the Act's coverage.
One case has considered the issue of how clear a religious employer must be when claiming its employment practices are covered by the religious affiliation exception. In Ritter v. Mount St.
Mary's College,44 a female lay teacher was denied tenure by a nonprofit Catholic college and brought an action under title VII alleging sex and age discrimination. The district court denied the College's motion for summary judgment, holding that a material issue
of genuine fact existed as to whether religion played any role in
the decision affecting the teacher.4 5 Although the school had a
stated policy of favoring the hiring of priests, nothing in the record
indicated the tenure decision was based on a religious motivation. 46
C. Minister Exception
Courts have also fashioned another special area of exemption
for discriminatory practices by religious groups: they will not interfere with internal church administration or ecclesiastical matters. In McClure v. Salvation Army, 4 7 the Fifth Circuit applied
this exemption even though it specifically held that "[t]he language and the legislative history of section 701 compelled the conclusion that Congress did not intend that a religious organization
be exempted from liability for discriminating against its employees
41. Id. at 819.
42. Id. at 828. The court therefore denied the defendants' motion either to dismiss or grant summary judgment with regard to the claims under state and federal

laws involving illegal religious discrimination. Id. at 825-26. For an example of a
court upholding the application of the FCC's anti-bias rules against a radio station
licensee affiliated with a religious organization for positions not connected with
religious programs, see King's Garden, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,
498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. See supra note 27.
44. 495 F. Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980).
45. Id. at 730.
46. Id. at 729. The court found the grounds for denial of tenure to be unclear.
47. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972), reh'g denied,

409 U.S. 1050 (1972).
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on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin with respect to
of
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
their
48
employment."
In McClure, a female Salvation Army officer 49 alleged that
the Salvation Army had not treated her equally with males as to
pay and fringe benefits. She further alleged that she was discharged in retaliation for complaints she made to her supervising
officers and to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter EEOC). The court held against the plaintiff on the
ground that she was a minister and the involvement of the court in
a church-minister employment relationship would impermissibly
50
impinge on the Salvation Army's free exercise rights.
5
In a similar case, Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation,'
the Fifth Circuit refused to grant subject matter jurisdiction where
a minister who had been removed from his position brought suit
against church officials and parishioners. The court held that the
minister's situation involved an ecclesiastical question outside the
52
powers of the civil court.
In Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 53 a white female brought an action for sexual and racial dis-

crimination after being denied a pastoral position with the
church.54 The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant church55 and on appeal the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The circuit court noted that "churches are not-and shall not beabove the law" but where, as here, the church's decisions involve
48. 460 F.2d at 558.
49. In the Salvation Army, officers are the equivalent of a minister or similar
religious leader in other religious organizations.
50. 460 F.2d at 555. The court limited its holding on the free exercise issue to
the ecclesiastical "church-minister" relationship. The court noted that "[tihe relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters
touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical
concern." Id. at 558-59.
51. 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 492. The court noted the importance of maintaining religious organizations' freedom from state involvement in their internal eccelesiastical matters.
Id. at 493.
53. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 333 (1986).
54. The plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, held a
Master of Divinity degree and Ph.D. in psychology. She applied for an associate in
Pastoral Care internship with the Conference and for a pastoral staff vacancy at a
church in Tacoma Park, Maryland. When both positions were awarded to another
woman, the plaintiff sued under title VII. Id. at 1165.
55. The district court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment
for the defendant on the grounds that the General Conference should be dismissed
as a defendant and on the grounds that the religion clauses of the first amendment
barred a title VII suit. Id. at 1166.
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its "spiritual functions,"56 application of title VII would violate the
church's free exercise and establishment protections.5 7
The minister exception is not an impenetrable defense, given
that one court has distinguished a certain factual situation from
the McC7ure58 and Simpson 59 rationale. The district court in
Whitney v. Greater New York Corporation of Seventh-Day Adventists6O held for a church typist-receptionist who alleged that
she had been discharged because of a "casual social relationship"
with a man of another race. 61 The court distinguished the case
from McClure, finding that the typist-receptionist's position was
far removed from the type of relationship the church has with one
of its ministers, thus presenting no first amendment free exercise
62
problem.
The same distinction was applied in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College.63 A female psychology professor charged that the college, which was run under the
auspices of the Mississippi Baptist Convention, refused to hire her
on account of her sex. She also charged that the school discriminated on the basis of race in its recruiting and hiring practices. 64
When the EEOC attempted to investigate the charges of discrimination, the school refused to comply with their investigation, arguing that it was exempt from any governmental inquiry.6 5 The
court rejected the school's argument stating:
The facts distinguish this case from McClure. The College is
not a church. The College's faculty and staff do not function
as ministers. The faculty members are not intermediaries be56. Id. at 1171.
57. Id. at 1167-71. In its reasoning, the court noted that there is only a narrow
exemption to religious institutions regarding the coverage of title VII. Id. at 1166.
The court, however, found that application of title VII in this case would restrict a

church's free choice of its leaders, and that the state cannot substitute its guidance
for that of the Holy Spirit in selecting church leaders. Id. at 1168, 1170.
58. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.

60. 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
61. The plaintiff alleged that she was discharged and evicted because she, a
white, "was maintaining a casual social relationship with ...

a black man." Id. at

1365.
62. Id. at 1368. The court found that the facts did not fall within the "churchminister relationship" outlined in McClure, supra notes 47-50 and accompanying
text.
63. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
64. 626 F.2d at 479-80. The court dealt separately with issues relating to the
race discrimination allegations. Id. at 481-84.

65. Id. at 484. The College argued that its hiring practices fell under the 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1 exception, relating to the right to hire persons of a particular religion. The College also argued that the McClure "church-minister relationship"
holding applied to its situation, and that EEOC jurisdiction over it would violate its
establishment clause rights and its free exercise rights. Id. at 484-86, 488.
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tween a church and its congregation. They neither attend to
the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct students in the
whole of religious doctrine. That faculty members are expected to serve as exemplars of practicing Christians does not
serve to make the terms and conditions of their employment
matters of church administration and thus purely of ecclesiastical concern. The employment relationships between Mississippi College and its faculty and staff is one intended by
Congress to be regulated by title VII.66
In answering the school's defense that its establishment
clause rights were being violated, the court found that there was
not excessive governmental entanglement with religion as a result
of the EEOC's jurisdiction over the school concerning the
charges.6 7 In response to the school's asserted free exercise clause
arguments, the court found that the employment practices subject
to title VII did not involve religious beliefs or practices and the
government had "a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in all forms."68 The court also noted that:
Although the number of religious educational institutions is
minute in comparison to the number of employers subject to
Title VII, their effect upon society at large is great because of
the role they play in educating society's young. If the environment in which such institutions seek to achieve their religious
and educational goals reflects unlawful discrimination, those
discriminatory attitudes will be perpetuated with an influential segment of society, the detrimental effect of which cannot
be estimated. Because the burden placed upon the free exercise of religion by the application of Title VII to religious educational institutions is slight, because society's interest in
eradicating discrimination is compelling, and because the creation of an exemption greater than that provided by Section 702
66. Id. at 485.
67. Id. at 487. In deciding the establishment clause issue, the court used the
three-prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971): "(1) whether
the statute has a secular legislative purpose, (2) whether the principal or primary
effect of the statute is neither to advance nor to inhibit religion, and (3) whether
the statute fosters 'an excessive government entanglement with a religion.'" Mississippi College focused on the third criterion and found that such a minimal burden on the school in applying title VII was not excessive government entanglement.
626 F.2d at 486, 488.
68. 626 F.2d at 488. Citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the court
stated that in examining whether a free exercise problem exists, the Supreme
Court has considered:
(1) the magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief, (2) the existence of a compelling state interest justifying
the burden imposed upon the exercise of the religious belief, and
(3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute
would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state.
626 F.2d at 488. The court concluded that the government's compelling interest in
ending discrimination outweighed the minimal burden to the College of applying
title VII. Id. at 489.
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would seriously undermine Congress' attempts to eliminate
discrimination, we conclude the application of Title VII to educational institutions such as Mississippi College does 69not violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
Consequently, the court held the "church-minister" exception did
not apply to the College because of its largely secular nature, and
therefore the EEOC had jurisdiction to investigate discrimination
charges against the school.
D.

Compensation and Benefit Discrimination

The right of a religious organization to discriminate was further narrowed in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Pacific Press Publishing Association.7 0 In this case, the EEOC
brought an employment discrimination suit against the Pacific
Press Publishing Association, a religious publishing house owned
and operated by the Seventh Day Adventist Church. The EEOC
brought the action in federal district court under title VII on the
ground that two women employees were victims of discrimination
by receiving lower monetary allowances than those received by
male employees. The EEOC also asserted that the two women
were terminated in retaliation for bringing their case to the attention of the EEOC.71 The district court held against the publishing
house, 72 which then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The circuit court concluded that Congress specifically in73
tended title VII to apply to this type of an employment situation.
The terminated women also did not fall within the "church-minister" exemption, 74 and the Adventist Church proclaimed a policy
and belief against discriminating on the basis of sex. 75 Consequently, the court held that since "the impact on religious belief is
minimal and the federal interest in equal employment opportuni69. 626 F.2d at 489.
70. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 1275. The court also was required to consider the issue of whether
application of title VII to the case presented a free exercise or establishment clause

problem.
72. 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
73. 676 F.2d at 1276. The court stated:
The legislative history of this exemption [42 U.S.C. 2000e-1] shows that
although Congress permitted religious organizations to discriminate in

favor of members of their faith, religious employers are not immune
from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, or
for retaliatory actions against employees who exercise their rights
under the statute.

Id.
74. 676 F.2d at 1278. The court noted that the McClure rationale does not apply
because the duties involved did not relate to that of a minister or seminary teacher.
75. Id. at 1279. Therefore, title VII's equal pay provision could not conflict with

the church's religious beliefs.
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ties is high, the balance weighs heavily in favor of upholding Press'
liability under Title VII for its use of sexually discriminatory wage
scales ....
A total exemption for Pacific Press and similar enterprises would represent a serious conflict with the government's
76
equal employment objectives."
The court commented specifically on the retaliatory dismissal, noting that the Press asserted the dismissals were based on
religious grounds, "citing .

..

violation of church doctrines which

prohibit lawsuits by members against the church."77 In dismissing
the Press' argument, the court held:
[permitting] the various Adventist institutions to retaliate
against employees who challenge discrimination through
EEOC procedures would defeat Congress' intention to protect
employees of religious employers. The effect would be to
withdraw title VII's protection from employees at the hundreds of diverse organizations affiliated with the Adventist
church, including businesses which process food, sell insurance, invest in stocks and bonds, and run
schools, hospitals,
78
laboratories, rest homes and sanitariums.
The court affirmed that the discharged employees had "a constitutional right to inform the government of violations of federal
law.'"79

The circuit court upheld the district court decision and dismissed the Press' further contention that the matter involved was
an intra-church doctrinal dispute.8 0 It also rejected the Press' argument that the EEOC's jurisdiction over the publisher would involve major entanglement problems. The court specifically said
that the "EEOC's relationship to religious employers threatens no
more entanglement than other statutes which regulate employee
compensation at religious institutions."s1
In Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,8 2 a United States district court in California denied a
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1280.
78. Id. The court stressed the government's high priority and compelling interest in guaranteeing equal employment opportunities.
79. Id. Without legal recourse, the individual's right to bring charges under title
VII would not be protected.
80. Id. at 1281. The court rejected the "church-minister" argument offered by
the Press on the grounds that such an exemption would prohibit lawsuits which are
part of the enforcement mechanism Congress intended title VII to provide. The
court noted that the church was still free to exercise ecclesiastical sanctions against
the parties.
81. Id. at 1282. The court carefully distinguished this case from NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), where the NLRB attempted to exercise mandatory
collective bargaining provisions at a sectarian school because there would result no
ongoing scrutiny of Press' operations.
82. 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 5956 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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summary judgment motion by the Seventh-Day Adventist Church.
The court reasoned that application of the equal pay provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act83 to the non-ministerial, lay employees of the church's schools did not impinge on the church's first
amendment guarantees.8 4 Furthermore, the court held that audits
by the EEOC of the school's payroll records would not amount to
impermissible entanglement.8 5 A subsequent attempt by the
church to stay discovery orders relating to the payroll records was
86
also denied.
In a case similar to Marshall, the court in Donovan v. Central Baptist Church, Victoria 8 7 upheld the Secretary of Labor's
discovery efforts in investigating alleged violations of the minimum wage laws of the Fair Labor Standards Act by a church-run
day-care center.8 8 The church alleged that the day-care center was
an "integral part" of its ministry and that it should be exempt
from the wage laws under the first amendment.8 9 The court concluded that the church must first answer the interrogatories submitted to it before the court could determine if the first
amendment objections were valid.90 The court noted that requiring the church to answer these interrogatories would not involve
"excessive entanglement with the Church or interfere with anyone's free exercise of religion." 91
In the recent Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Fremont Christian School 92 case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a partial summary judgment and injunction against a school operated
by the First Assembly of God Church which provided health insurance only to single persons and married men. At the district court,
the school argued that its practice of discriminating against female
83. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
84. The district court rejected the church's free exercise and entanglement arguments. 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) at
5957-59.
85. The court found the entanglement involved in reviewing the records to be
minimal. Id.
86. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S.
1305 (1977).
87. 96 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
88. The Secretary had submitted four interrogatories which questioned who
worked at the day-care center, how they were paid, and what the requirements of
the positions were. The church was seeking a protective order from answering the
interrogatories. Id. at 6.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 6. The court stated: "This information is critical to the ultimate resolution of this case." Otherwise, it could not determine whether the day-care employees were ministers and therefore exempted from the application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. Id.
91. Id.
92. 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
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employees was based on religious belief and was therefore protected by the free exercise and establishment clauses.93 The district court rejected the school's first amendment arguments and
granted partial summary judgment for violations of title VII and
94
the Equal Pay Act.
The issue in the case involved the school's practice of provid95
ing health insurance only to "head of household" employees.
The practice was based on the school's and its sponsoring church's
religious belief that "while the sexes are equal in dignity before
God, they are differentiated in role."96 The school asserted that
"in any marriage, the husband is the head of the household and is
required to provide for that household... regardless of what his
salary is in relation to that of the wife." 97 While it did not offer
health insurance on an equal basis, the school provided equal pay
scales 98 and disability and life insurance to all of its employees, regardless of sex.99 As an act of Christian charity, in cases where
the husband was incapable of providing for his family,'0 0 the
school also provided health benefits to a full-time married employee only for the time of her husband's incapacity. O1
The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the school's arguments that both title VI1102 and the Equal Pay Act should not apply to the school.103 With regard to the school's free exercise
claim, the court found a lack of substantial impact on the religious
beliefs of the school to warrant protecting the school's continued
use of the discriminatory practices.104 Addressing the school's establishment clause argument, the court held that since "the duties
of the teachers . . . do not fulfill the function of a minister," no
93. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fremont Christian School, 34
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
94. Id. at 1045.
95. 781 F.2d at 1364.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1365.
98. Id. at 1364. Before 1976, the school paid married male employees at a rate

above similarly situated female employees but ceased this practice when it feared
possible adverse legal consequences.
99. Id.
100. Such incapacity might be the result of illness or nonworking student status.
Id. at 1365.
101. However, the school still considered the husband to be the scripturally required head of the household. Id.
102. The school argued that it was exempted under the religion exemption, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982), as well as the bona fide occupational qualification exemption of section 703(e) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 781 F.2d at 1365-66.

103. 781 F.2d at 1367.
104. Id. at 1368. The school's sponsoring church did not have a formal belief of
discriminating against women, and the school's practice of providing other benefits
without regard to sex weakened its free exercise claim. Id. at 1368-69.
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excessive entanglement was involved.105 The school's employment
practices were therefore subject only to the coverage of title
VII.106
In Russell v. Belmont College,107 a female teacher brought a
gender employment discrimination suit under both title VII and
the Equal Pay Act' 0 8 against Belmont College, a school operated
by the Tennessee Baptist Convention.109 In its decision, the court
first considered whether the first amendment permitted a churchcontrolled educational institution such as Belmont College to discriminatorily compensate its employees on the basis of sex." 0 The
court concluded that the college was not exempted from the Equal
Pay Act."' Because the college did not assert as a central tenet of
the Baptist faith its practice of discriminatory compensation of its
employees on the basis of sex, the court held that application of
the Equal Pay Act to the college would violate neither the college's free exercise rightsl 2 nor its establishment clause rights.113
E. Seminary Faculty Exception
An important extension of the church-minister exception was
expressed in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary.114 This case dealt
with the difficult issue of the degree of discrimination permitted at
a seminary. The EEOC brought the suit to establish jurisdiction
over the Seminary, which was affiliated with the Southern Baptist
105. Id. at 1370. The school had argued "that because the School [was] an integral part of the religious mission of the Church to its children, coupled with the
highly specialized role of the teacher, a role it claim[ed] to be a ministry, the entanglement implications [were] significant." Id. at 1369.
106. Id. at 1370.
107. 554 F. Supp. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978 & Supp. 1986).
109. 554 F. Supp. at 669-70.
110. Id. at 672.
111. Id. at 675-76. The court found the plaintiff and defendant fit within the definitional meaning of "employer and employee" under the Fair Labor Standards Act
and its amendment, the Equal Pay Act.
112. 554 F. Supp. at 676. The court found no evidence that Belmont College believed it was obliged by the tenets of the Baptist Church to compensate discriminatorily based on sex. Therefore, the state's compelling interest to end discrimination
overcame any minimal burden to the College of applying the Equal Pay Act. Id. at
676-77.
113. Id. at 677. Since Belmont College would be subjected "only to limited investigation and de novo judicial determination," the court reasoned that application of
the Equal Pay Act to the College would not foster excessive government entanglement. Id. at 678 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
114. 485 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd in part, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981),
reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Convention, to compel the Seminary to submit staff information
reports required by the EEOC. The Seminary refused to submit
the reports, alleging that the EEOC's jurisdiction would violate its
115
first amendment religion rights.
In deciding the case, the district court found the Seminary to
have a "pervasively religious environment" 116 which, for its continuation, necessitated that all employees "be willing members of the
ecclesia."117 The court found that even support personnel "perform a bona fide religious and educational function." 118 The Seminary regarded "its employment decisions as divinely guided
assessments of each employee's suitability for the position he will
occupy in relation to the students and as a representative of the
institution [and therefore sought] to assert its right to make these
intensely subjective decisions without government supervision." 119
Since the court found "[t]he operation of a seminary [to be] an ultimate religious activity entitled to the highest degree of first
amendment protection," 120 and the Seminary's employment decisions to be "steeped in a perception of divine will and inseparable
from its mission,"12 1 the court could not require the Seminary to
122
comply with EEOC reporting requirements.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considerably
narrowed this holding.1 23 Although the circuit court found the
2
"Seminary's role [to be] vital to the Southern Baptist Church"1 4
and "essential to the paramount function of training ministers who
will continue the faith,"125 it narrowed the categories of employees
falling under the minister exception to title VII coverage. Because
the Seminary faculty served as "intermediaries" and "instruct[ed]
115. 485 F. Supp. at 257.
116. Id. at 258. The Seminary's bylaws, in fact, prohibited strictly secular matters in the curriculum.
117. Id. All employees were expected to contribute to "a unified religious endeavor ......
118. Id. at 259. Membership in the Baptist Church, however, was not a requirement for support personnel.
119. Id. All employees were "encouraged and expected to view their work as ful-

fillment of a religious calling."
120. Id. at 260. The court stated that "[t]he risk of unseemly governmental entanglement increases exponentially as the function of an institution becomes more
fundamentally and pervasively religious."
121. Id. at 261.
122. Id. The court feared that the "good faith and legitimacy" of the Seminary's
religious grounds would be questioned if title VII were imposed, and that employment functions would have to be dissected into "religious and secular components."
123. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
124. 651 F.2d at 281.
125. Id. at 283.
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the seminarians in the 'whole of religious doctrine'" and taught
only "religiously oriented courses," the minister exception applied
to them.126 The court also found, however, that this exception did
not apply to support and part-time staff,127 and it did not have sufficient information to know whether some or all of the administrators fell under the minister exception. 128 In so doing, the court
noted that "[w]hen churches expand their operations beyond the
traditional functions essential to the propagation of their doctrine,
those employed to perform tasks which are not traditionally ecclesiastical or religious are not 'ministers of a church' entitled to McClure-type protection."12

9

In weighing the burden of requiring the Seminary to file the
required EEOC forms against the seminary's establishment clause
and free exercise clause rights, the circuit court concluded no constitutional violation existed:130 "an exemption for the Seminary's
support staff and other non-ministers is not constitutionally
compelled."131
F. Theology Faculty Exception
The seminary faculty exception and the "church-minister"
exception were extended to include theology department faculty
members in the case of Maguire v. Marquette University.132 A
woman who had unsuccessfully sought a theology position at Marquette University, a Catholic institution, filed suit alleging sex discrimination. 133 The district court granted summary judgment for
the University, holding that "a federal court is [not] the appropriate forum in which to decide who should teach in the theology de126. Id. at 283-84. In an unclear passage, the court also noted that "Igliven the
unique role of the faculty of any school, they are afforded unique protection." Id.
at 284 (citation omitted).

127. Id. Those denied coverage of the minister exception included four ordained
ministers who worked as non-ministerial support personnel.
128. Id. at 284-85. The circuit court referred the matter of determining which
administrators qualified as ministers to the district court, in the event the parties
were unable to agree as to which positions qualified. Id. at 285.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 285-87. The court found no excessive degree of government entanglement. Since the Seminary did not hold a religious tenet requiring sex discrimination, there was no burden on the exercise of religious belief. Id. at 286.
131. Id. at 287. As the court noted in giving its decision, "[n]either the Supreme
Court nor this court has held that the employment relationship between a church
and all of its employees is a matter of purely ecclesiastical concern." Id.
132. 627 F. Supp. 1499 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
133. The plaintiff charged violations of title VII and also of state and university
policy regarding academic freedom. The court rejected the academic freedom
charge as having no basis in law. Id. at 1507.
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partment at a Catholic university." 134
The plaintiff, who herself was a Catholic, specifically alleged
that her application was rejected because of her sex and because
35
the University perceived her views on abortion as unacceptable.
36
it
The University argued that under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2)1
was specially exempted from discrimination charges when made
on the basis of religion since it was controlled by the Jesuits-a
Catholic religious society. 137 The plaintiff argued that the exemption did not apply because the school could only discriminate
against non-Catholics and she was a Catholic. 138 . The court, however, rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that whether she
was a Catholic was a "question... the First Amendment leaves to
139
theology departments and church officials, not federal judges."'
In reaching its decision, the court likened the case to McC7ure 1 40 and Rayburn,141 both "church-minister" exception cases.
It stated that "[tihere is probably no teaching position at Marquette University which is more closely tied to the University's
religious character than that of theology professor."' 142 The court
reasoned that if it became involved in the hiring process of a theology professor, it would violate the free exercise clause and impermissibly entangle government with religion.143 The court did not
want to "impose upon the theology department at Marquette [its]
judgment as to what comprise[d] adherence to the Catholic
faith."144 The court was especially hesitant to intervene when
Marquette did not believe the plaintiff's theological beliefs made
45
her "an appropriate person" to teach theology there.'
134. Id. at 1500-01.
135. Id. at 1502.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) reads in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not be unlawful employment practice for a school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to
hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, associaton, or society ....
137. 627 F. Supp. at 1502-03.
138. Id. at 1503.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.

142.
143.
144.
145.

627 F. Supp. at 1504.
Id. at 1505.
Id.
Id. at 1507.
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G. DiscriminationBased on Morality

At least one court has refused to apply differing moral standards to women and men in a religious employment setting. In
Dolter v. Wahlert High School,146 a single lay teacher at a private
high school sued under title VII alleging she was terminated due
to her pregnancy and marital status. The teacher had notified the
school of her pregnancy prior to renewing her contract, but the
school later refused to honor that contract and terminated the
teacher.147 The school defended its positon on the grounds that as
a private Roman Catholic high school, it was exempt from the application of title VII under its first amendment rights. It also asserted that it was entitled to set standards of morality under the
"bona fide occupational qualifications" exception to title VII, allowing it to terminate the teacher for her improper moral
8
standards.14
After the court determined that title VII applied to the action,149 it addressed the high school's specific assertions. The
school had argued that title VII jurisdiction over it "would necessarily require the court to pass judgment on the legitimacy of its
religious teachings, its moral precepts and the administration of its
religious pedagogical ministry."150 The court reasoned that the issue before it was not the moral code of the school nor the religious
teachings of the Catholic Church. The court instead considered
whether the moral precepts were applied equally to the school's
male and female teachers, and whether the plaintiff was discharged because she was pregnant, rather than because she had
engaged in premarital sex.' 5 1 The court concluded that the extension of title VII over the school in a sex discrimination case would
not involve excessive entanglement in the religious mission of the
school nor would it violate the school's first amendment rights.152
146. 483 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
147. Id. at 267.
148. Id., citing title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).

149. Id. at 269. Using the holding in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440
U.S. 490 (1979), the court made a two-pronged analysis of whether title VII applied
in the instant case. The court first determined that Congress intended title VII to
apply to sectarian schools such as Wahlert High, and second, that application of title VII to sex discrimination, as opposed to religious discrimination, is proper. 483
F. Supp. at 268-69.
150. 483 F. Supp. at 270.
151. Id. The court pointed out that single male teachers in the school who were
known to have engaged in premarital sex were also not discharged, implying that
the plaintiff was discharged for being pregnant and not for violating the school's
moral code.
152. Id. at 270-71. Imposition of title VII would not involve day-to-day scrutiny
of the school administration, thereby violating its first amendment rights.
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In responding to the school's "bona fide occupational qualification" argument, the court concluded that the issue raised a question of fact needing to be resolved at trial. It noted, however, that
even if certain moral requirements were properly placed on teachers as occupational qualifications, the requirements could still not
153
be applied discriminatorily on the basis of sex.
H.

Overview

As a matter of law, gender discrimination by any employerincluding religious organizations-is prohibited. Title VII and similar state civil rights provisions designed to eliminate discrimination
are regarded as measures representing compelling state interests.154 While title VII does permit an exception for religious employers to selectively employ those of a particular religious
faith, 155 courts have held that the exception cannot be used as a
56
pretext for gender discrimination.1
Religious employers are bound by the same prohibitions
against sex discrimination as other employers, except for three
narrow areas the courts have singled out. Because of overriding
constitutional concerns, courts will not interfere, even in the face
of a discrimination charge, in an ecclesiastical "church-minister"
relationship,157 where an inquiry into a seminary's internal administration is required,15S or where the selection of a theology faculty
member is involved. 159 Apart from these narrow exceptions,
courts have enforced both the legislative intent of title VII and the
public policy disfavoring employment discrimination against religious employers.160
III.

Analysis of the Dayton Christian Schools Decision

In Dayton ChristianSchools,161 the trial court faced a fact situation requiring a determination of first amendment issues not un153. Id. at 271. The plaintiff included in her affidavit her assertion of knowledge
of other single teachers in the schools "known to have violated defendant's asserted
code of conduct" against premarital sex and who were not discharged.
154. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112 (Page
1980 & Supp. 1985).
155. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-1 (1976).
156. See supra note 23.
157. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 114-131 and accompanying text.

159. See supra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.
160. See generally supra notes 70-113, 146-153 and accompanying text.
161. Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 578 F. Supp. 1004

(S.D. Ohio 1984), rev'd, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct.
2718 (1986).
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like the issues faced by courts in the other cases cited in this
article. The major issue before the court was whether the Ohio
Civil Rights Commission could permissibly exercise jurisdiction
over Dayton Christian Schools "to investigate and to conduct a
hearing on the charge that the school discriminated on the basis of
sex and/or engaged in prohibited retaliatory employer practices
when it terminated a female teacher's employment contract." 16 2
In approaching the jurisdictional issue, the district court
found that the religious purpose and mission of DCS was the propagation of the Christian faith and that its religious orientation was
an integral part of the school's philosophy and operation.163 The
court further concluded that the plaintiff, Ms. Hoskinson, had not
been aware of any school policy regarding pregnancy, nor was the
school's philosophy concerning pregnancy ever specifically described to its employees.164 The court also determined "that the
immediate ostensible precipitating cause of Hoskinson's discharge
was the fact that she went to an attorney to obtain advice and
assistance in resisting the decision not to renew her contract be' 165
cause she was pregnant.
The court relied on the findings of the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission's initial investigation. The Commission had found
that the "[e]vidence and testimony indicate that but for the fact
that Complainant is female and elected to have a child, she would
have been offered a teaching contract for the 1979-1980 school
year."166 The Commission had also established that "[e]vidence

and testimony indicate that Complainant would not have been
thus treated had she been a male, and that therefore, she had been
167
discriminated against because of her sex."'

162. 578 F. Supp. at 1008.
163. Id. at 1010. The court based its finding on the evidence, noting that the
plaintiff had not offered evidence to the contrary.
164. Id. at 1012. The court said, "Based on the exhibits presented by Plaintiff, it
appears that the School's philosophy concerning pregnancy was not anywhere specifically delineated for its employees." Id. The court further noted:
Mr. Schindler [the principal] acknowledged in his testimony that We

had not adequately explained this [philosphy] to our faculty and to our
staff.... [T]hus Mrs. Hoskinson was not fully aware of the convictions
of the administration and of the School Board relative to this particular Biblical principle.' Since there was nothing in writing, Mrs. Hoskinson had no way of knowing the policy ....
Id.
165. Id. at 1013. Hoskinson had retained an attorney to represent her in attempting to keep her job at the school. DCS considered this to be in violation of

the "Biblical Chain of Command" and was grounds for her immediate dismissal.
See supra notes 3-4.
166. 578 F. Supp. at 1015.
167. Id.
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In order to avoid a needless constitutional conflict, the district court examined the construction of the applicable Ohio Civil
Rights provisions to determine if they could be interpreted in such
a manner so as to prevent a conflict with constitutionally protected
rights.168 The court examined the conflicting interests of the
school and the statutes designed to prevent discrimination based
on sex. 169 It determined that since the jurisdiction of the Commission did not present "the clear possibility of ongoing and intensive
oversight," the Ohio legislature therefore intended "the jurisdiction of [the Commission] to extend to religious schools such as
DCS."170

Having resolved the question of the applicability of the Ohio
Civil Rights provisions, the court addressed the plaintiffs' specific
constitutional claims. It dismissed outright the plaintiffs' charges
of overbreadth'71 and vagueness. 172 The plaintiffs also had asserted a violation of their free exercise rights, arguing that the
173
school's decision had been based on legitimate religious tenets.
The Commission attempted to counter this argument by charging
that Hoskinson's termination was based on the personal philosophy of Mr. Shindler, the principal, and not on any true religious
convictions. 174 The Commission had contended that the eventual
dismissal of Hoskinson for violating the "Biblical Chain of Com168. Id. at 1018. The court wished to avoid needless determination of constitutional issues if construction of the statute involved could be done so as to "obviate
the apparent conflicts with constitutional rights to which the Plaintiffs object." Id.
The specific statutes involved were Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112 (Page 1980 & Supp.
1985) which the court found to be the equivalent of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 578
F. Supp. at 1019. The court noted that the Ohio statutes appeared to adopt "an even
broader prohibition against discriminatory practices." 578 F. Supp. at 1019. An employer could adopt a "bona fide occupational qualification," such as membership in
a particular religion, but such a qualification had to be certified by the Commission,
according to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02(E) (Page 1980). 578 F. Supp. at 1020.
169. 578 F. Supp. at 1018-24. The court made a lengthy analysis of the legislative
intent of the Ohio statutes and concluded that the legislature intended the Commission to have jurisdiction over sectarian schools like DCS. Id. at 1024.
170. Id. The court decided that the jurisdiction of the Commission over schools
like DCS would not cause the kind of state encroachment into sectarian administration of the school that the Supreme Court had disfavored in Catholic Bishop.
171. Id. at 1025-26. The court noted that the Ohio statute's failure to have an exemption for religious employers, as found in title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1, was not
enough of an infringement to make it unconstitutional.
172. Id. at 1026-27. The court held that the words "to discriminate" were not unnecessarily vague, especially in light of the national commitment "to afford each individual an equal opportunity in life." Id.
173. Id. at 1027. The school argued that, by consulting an attorney, Hoskinson
had violated the religious tenet of following the "Biblical Chain of Command" and
of not refraining from making a bad report. The school also argued that if the
court considered the termination to be based on Hoskinson's pregnancy, the court
should regard this decision as based on a religious tenet.
174. Id. at 1027-28.
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mand" was a pretext for Hoskinson's termination because of her
75
pregnancy.1
In resolving the free exercise question, the court examined
the nature of the religious belief upon which DCS made its decision to terminate Hoskinson.176 The court determined the school's
beliefs that a mother's place was home with her small children
and that the "Biblical Chain of Command" was biblically inspired
deserved constitutional protection as free exercise claims.177 The
court concluded, however, that the Commi sion's investigation and
hearing, as well as any future investigations or hearings regarding
Hoskinson's termination, would only minimally impinge upon or
burden the school's constitutionally protected rights.' 78 It held
"that though the extension of [the Commission's] jurisdiction over
DCS to investigate and to conduct a hearing on Hoskinson's discharge may impinge to a limited degree on Plaintiffs' free exercise
rights, the state has a compelling and overriding interest in elimi79
nating sex discrimination in the employment setting.'
In addressing DCS's final argument of an establishment
clause violation, the court examined whether the jurisdiction of
the Commission over DCS presented an impermissible entanglement by the state into the sectarian interests of the school. The
court concluded that:
the occasional intrusion of the [Commission] into the adminis175. Id. at 1028. The Commission argued a "but for" "chain of events" analysis
and urged that decisions to have a child "should not be denied persons simply because they choose to work in parochial school." Id.
176. Id. at 1028-32. The court found no basis for a McClure "church-minister"
exemption. It also refused to say that a religious belief not commonly held or documented was deserving of first amendment protection. Id. at 1031.
177. Id. at 1028-32. The court found the initial decision not to renew Hoskinson's
contract was based on religious precepts. The court was therefore forced to consider whether a compelling enough state interest existed to permit the Commission
to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over DCS and to burden its free exercise
rights.
178. Id. at 1035. The court weighed the infringement on DCS's beliefs, the compelling interest of the state in ending discrimination, and the protected freedom of
choice in marriage and family matters. The court noted that the Ohio Civil Rights
provisions in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.01(B) (Page 1980) specifically includes
"because of or on the basis of pregnancy" in its definition of discrimination on the
basis of sex. Id. at 1035.
179. Id. at 1037. The court held that even though the school's:
beliefs may arguably be burdened somewhat by allowing the [Commission] to investigate and to conduct a hearing on charges of sex discrimination and retaliatory employer conduct at DCS, the state's interest
in eradicating invidious discrimination and in providing protection to
those who seek to vindicate their rights under Chapter 4112 are sufficiently compelling to justify the slight impingement that may result on
Plaintiffs' free exercise rights.
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tration of DCS to respond to charges of sex discrimination and
retaliatory employer practices will not lead.., to an excessive
level of government entanglement . . . and thus does not run
afoul of the proscription contained in the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution.180
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded. 18 ' The court held that the Commission's jurisdiction
over DCS violated the plaintiffs' first amendment free exercise
and establishment clause rights.' 8 2 It examined the religious background and focus of the school and relied heavily on the district
18 3
The
court's finding of the school's pervasively religious nature.
court reviewed the applicable Ohio Civil Rights provision and the
state's interest in eliminating employment discrimination on the
basis of sex.' 8 4 In balancing the interests of the state against the
free exercise rights guaranteed to the school, the court found that
the Ohio Civil Rights Act placed a heavy burden on DCS's exercise
of its religious beliefs. Although the court recognized that the
state's interest was substantial, the interest did not justify "such a
85
broad and onerous limitation."1
In addition, the court concluded that an impermissible degree
of entanglement existed which violated the school's establishment
clause protections, and that "[t]he statute in this case, as applied by
the [Commission], clearly operate[d] to discourage the practice of
180. 578 F. Supp. at 1040-41. The court relied on Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981), see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text, and Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982), see supra
notes 70-81 and accompanying text, to find that no more excessive degree of entanglement would result in allowing Ohio's enforcement against DCS than would be
applicable under title VII. Id. at 1040.
181. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932
(6th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd and remanded, 106 S. Ct.
2718 (1986).
182. Id. at 955, 961.
183. Id. at 936-40. The court examined at length the philosophy and religious
foundations of the school's educational purpose and goals, including its beliefs in
the "Biblical Chain of Command" and a mother's duty to remain at home.
184. Id. at 940-44. The court found that "the statute asserts a clear expression of
intent to apply the prohibitions at issue in this case to all employers, including religious institutions." Id. at 944.
185. Id. at 954. The court held "that allowing the [Commission] to assert jurisdiction over the instant complaint against DCS when such complaint is based on
conduct pursuant to admittedly sincerely held religious beliefs and where the Ohio
Civil Rights Act makes no provision for accommodation of those beliefs, unduly
burdens the plaintiffs' right to free exercise of religion." Id. at 955. The court
based its holding in part on a concern that deciding against DCS would require parents and congregations to be faced "essentially with either supporting a school
staffed by faculty who flout basic tenets of their religion or abandoning their support of Christian education altogether." Id. at 952.
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religious belief."18 6 The court concluded that to allow the Commission to have jurisdiction over DCS would necessarily result in
an excessive state/church entanglement because of the school's
pervasively religious nature and the teacher's particularly sensitive
role in explicitly and implicitly fostering the religious beliefs and
values of the school. Thus, religious considerations pervaded the
hiring scheme of DCS and the Commission should not have inter187
fered with the school's employment practices.
The Commission appealed the court of appeals decision denying its right to investigate DCS's employment practices.188 Based
on a Younger v. Harris analysis,18 9 the Supreme Court held that
the federal district court should have abstained from hearing the
case. A detailed discussion of the Supreme Court's use of the abstention doctrine is beyond the scope of this article.190 Nevertheless, it is essential to realize that the Court in its holding was
saying that the case should have been left to the Ohio administrative processes and state courts to decide.191
In reversing the circuit court decision on a Younger rationale,
the Supreme Court noted that it was completely appropriate for a
state administrative body, such as the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, to investigate a religious employer where probable cause has
been found that discrimination took place.192 As the Court stated:
"[T]he Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of Hoskinson's discharge in this case,
if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason
186. Id. at 961. The circuit court, unlike the district court, relied on Catholic

Bishop to hold that the Commission's jurisdiction over DCS would impermissibly
involve it in the school's sectarian decisions relating to administration of the school.
Id. at 959-60.
187. Id. at 961. The court believed the Ohio Civil Rights Act, as applied to DCS
in this case, would operate to discourage the practice of religious beliefs.
188. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 106 S. Ct. 2718
(1986).
189. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Based on concerns regarding comity and federalism, the
Younger abstention doctrine puts forward "strong policies counseling against the

exercise of... jurisdiction where particular kinds of state proceedings have already
been commenced." Dayton ChristianSchools, 106 S. Ct. at 2722.
190. For a discussion of the abstention doctrine, see Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris:Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 Cornell L. Rev.
463 (1978); Frank L. Maraist, Federal Intervention in State CriminalProceedings:
Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1324 (1972); William H. Theis,
Younger v. Harris:Federalism in Context, 33 Hastings L.J. 103 (1981).

191. The concurring opinion by Stevens, J. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., joining) stated that "the District Court was entirely correct in concluding
that [DCS's] constitutional challenge to the remedial provisions of the Ohio statute
is not ripe for review." The Commission had not yet posed any sanction possibly

causing a constitutional conflict. 106 S. Ct. at 2725-26.
192. Id. at 2724.
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was in fact the reason for the discharge."1
The Court suggested that an investigation into possible discrimination does not, in and of itself, constitute a constitutional violation of the religious employer's first amendment rights.194 An
administrative body's mere exercise of jurisdiction over a religious
employer does not automatically violate the church's constitutional

rights.195

IV.

Policy Concerns: Employment Protection vs. Religious Freedom

In cases involving sexual discrimination in employment by
religious organizations, courts have wrestled with the problem of
balancing individual employment rights against the first amendment protections afforded to religious organizations. The decisions
have been at times inconsistent and have contained varied reasoning. Major policy concerns continue to rest on the issue of how
much deference the courts should give to religious organizations.
In Dayton Christian Schools, the circuit court chose to give
tremendous deference to the school in viewing Hoskinson's dismissal as constitutionally permissible. The court accepted the school's
fundamentalist religious beliefs regarding the place of women in
society and in the work place as protected religious beliefs. The
concepts that the fundamentalist Christian tradition, like those of
DCS, hold about the place of women in society and in the home do,
however, present difficult equal protection questions.
In general, fundamentalist Christians view the family as "a
nuclear group organized hierarchically with the man at the head,
exercising spiritual leadership and also caring for the material
well-being of his wife and children. Although subordinate to her
husband, the wife shares in the training and discipline of their offspring."'196 The family, therefore, is "dependent upon the father
for strong leadership, firm discipline, and financial support, and [it
looks] to the mother to serve as homemaker' and to dispense tenderness as a gentle counterpart to the father's stern hand."197 For
the Christian Fundamentalist, "[t]he derivation of Eve from
Adam's rib .

.

. implies the subservience of women to men ....

193. Id. The concurring opinion specifically approved of this language. Id. at
2725-26.
194. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that "[e]ven religious schools cannot claim to be wholly free from some state regulation." Id. at 2724.
195. The Court expressed its satisfaction that DCS would "receive an adequate
opportunity to raise its constitutional" challenges to the Commission in the Ohio
state forum. Id.
196. Kater, supra note 13.
197. Id.
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[Therefore] [fleminism, the struggle for equal rights, and the
movement of women into the work world are considered direct attacks on the divinely established position of the female sex in the
order of creation."198
Christian fundamentalists in general are quite unbending in
their view of sex roles, given that they view these roles as Godgiven.199 From the typical Christian fundamentalist's perspective,
the task of the woman is to be submissive in the home and to avoid
employment outside the home. 200 For many fundamentalists,
"[f]emininity, maternity, and domesticity constitute the appropri20
ate life-style of women." 1
Balancing fundamentalist religious beliefs against the constitutionally and statutorily protected right of women to fully and
equally participate in the work place is no easy task. In light of
Congress' strong intent to end sex discrimination,20 2 how much
deference should courts give to the legitimacy of the religious beliefs that put women in an unequal employment environment?
This is the critical question in the line of cases dealing with gender
discrimination by religious employers.
In Dayton Christian Schools, Hoskinson was informed that
her employment contract would not be renewed because she was
pregnant and because the school preferred a mother to be at home
with her young children. 203 While this belief had not been previously articulated by the school nor included in Hoskinson's employment contract, 204 it was nonetheless ultimately given the
198. Fackre, supra note 13.
199. Samuel Hill & Dennis Owen, The New Religious Right in America 18
(1982).
200. Kater, supra note 13, at 84.
201. Fackre, supra note 13. Religious commentator Daniel Maguire, in The New
Subversives: Anti-Americanism of the Religious Right (1982), at 133, argues that
the fundamentalist view of women encourages unexcusable sexism:
The New Right is a living museum of sexism. The family they want is
a sexist shrine where the authority (superiority) of the male is the cornerstone, set there by God himself. They would purge our schools and
libraries of all that touches on the liberation of woman [sic] from their
inferior image. Women are viewed as a hostile force, threatening the

various male domains. Jerry Falwell [citing Jerry Falwell, Listen,
America! 108 (1980)] uses a very significant verb to describe the movement of women into the world. He laments that from astronauts to
zoologists, almost every occupation has been "invaded" by women.
The "invaders" must be sent back to the hearth that is their destiny.
202. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Mississippi College, 626

F.2d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 1980); cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir.
1982).
203. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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status of a religious belief by the courts. 205 In restraining the government from affronting the school's conservative religious values,
the circuit court denied Hoskinson equal protection under the law.
Obviously, no man would have been faced with a situation
like Hoskinson's because men cannot be mothers and therefore be
subject to DCS's prohibition against teaching while small chldren
are at home. Furthermore, because Hoskinson attempted to assert
her legal rights against an administrative structure insensitive to
her equal protection rights,2 06 she was terminated. The reasoning
supporting Hoskinson's termination for seeking outside legal counsel was rejected in the Pacific Press case. 207 Hoskinson's dismissal,
therefore, was a direct result of a clear policy of unequal treatment of the sexes, a policy that would have been given religiousconstitutional protection by the circuit court if that decision had
not been reversed by the Supreme Court.
Although the court of appeals decision in Dayton Christian
Schools was overturned by the Supreme Court, future courts confronting similar discrimination claims will have to continue to consider which of two values will prevail: the full status and equality
of women in the work place and in society or the right of religious
organizations to carry out employment practices not permissible
elsewhere. The Supreme Court decision in Dayton Christian
Schools does not answer this question, but it does suggest that no
constitutional infirmity exists when an administrative body exercises its statutory right to investigate alleged employment discrimi208
nation against a religious employer where probable cause exists.
V.

Conclusion

In Dayton ChristianSchools, the circuit court deferred to the
school's religious views regarding women's status and overlooked
what otherwise would be unacceptable discrimination. 20 9 If not
overturned, the decision would have upheld discrimination aimed
solely at a woman, denied Hoskinson the opportunity to pursue
legal relief, and shielded the school's behavior under the cloak of
conservative religious values.
Courts should not give these types of "religious" values such
sweeping protection, especially when so much effort has gone into
205. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. The trial court found the beliefs
legitimate, and the circuit court relied on that finding. Dayton Christian Schools,

766 F.2d at
206. 766
207. 676
208. See
209. 766

936-41.
F.2d at 934.
F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
supra note 193 and accompanying text.
F.2d at 944.
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securing equal opportunity in the workplace. Both federal and
state legislatures have targeted sex discrimination in employment
as a serious social ill to be rooted out and eliminated. Extensive
legislation, such as title VII and state civil rights acts, have been
enacted to accomplish this end. 210 The eradication of sex discrimination is a compelling state interest, to be circumvented only by an
21
overriding justification. '
Courts have limited discrimination by churches to "churchminister,"2 12 theology faculty,2 13 and seminary faculty relation-

ships214 where the connection between the employment and sectarian ecclesiastical affairs was so intimate that the courts dared
not interfere. Consequently, in these very limited areas, sexual
discrimination can be carried out with impunity.
Public policy strongly dictates that the exemptions to discrimination by religious employers be very limited. Every time
sexual discrimination by a religious employer is sanctioned, the
broader the possibility for increased discrimination becomes. 215
Perhaps more importantly, when courts permit the expansion of
gender-based employment decisions, greater weight is also given to
the underlying attitudes or beliefs encouraging the discriminatory
practices.
Any court decision giving churches expanded permission to
circumvent employment law and to replace it with discriminatory
practices, enshrined in the cloak of religious belief, is indeed a very
dangerous proposition. It risks the establishment of a two-tiered
employment protection system-one providing full protection and
the other, in the name of religion, offering much less protection.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Dayton Christian
Schools risked expanding the already limited exceptions. Fortunately, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, and in doing so,
expressed its approval of investigations into discriminatory employment practices by religious groups where probable cause exists.216 Future courts facing similar issues should act to sustain the
very narrow grounds upon which churches have free reign to discriminate against women and to allow investigations of alleged discrimination whenever possible.
210. See supra note 154.
211. See supra note 68.
212. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.

213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-131 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.

